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This paper considers the implementation challenges facing the Basel
Committee￿s new proposals on bank capital standards. When compared with
the existing Capital Accord, the proposals represent a shift across two
intersecting dimensions-regulatory versus economic capital, and rules-based
versus process-oriented regulation. On minimum capital standards, the case
for using external ratings may be stronger than has been recognized, given the
divergences in the purpose and design of internal ratings. On supervisory
review, ensuring comparability among supervisors and building supervisory
capacity will present serious challenges. On enhancing market discipline,
incentives for markets to exercise discipline will be required.
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References 55I Introduction
This paper develops a conceptual framework for assessing the major
reorientation in bank capital adequacy regulation proposed in the Basel
Committee￿s New Capital Framework (NCF) consultative document.
1 The
NCF document outlines a series of measures which, taken collectively,
amount to a fundamental revision to the Committee￿s 1988 Capital Accord
(￿Accord￿). Intended only to apply to internationally active banks, and
representing an informal agreement between the central banks and bank
supervisory agencies of the G-10 countries, the Accord has since become
accepted as the de facto universal international standard for assessing banks￿
capital adequacy. Thus, a proposal to revise the Accord is a matter of immense
significance for the international financial system.
The primary aim of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework in which
both the Accord and the NCF can be grounded. This conceptual framework —
or map as we call it — rests on two intersecting dimensions (1) regulatory
capital versus economic capital, and (2) rules-based capital regulation versus
process-oriented capital regulation. The NCF represents a shift across both
dimensions of our conceptual map: from a rules-based to a process-oriented
approach to supervision of capital adequacy; and from a regulatory approach
to setting capital toward one based on economic capital allocation
mechanisms.  While the NCF offers important theoretical advantages over the
Accord, these advantages can only be realized if a number of implementation
challenges are overcome in both developed and developing financial markets.
The paper then turns to a critical analysis of the three ￿pillars￿ upon which the
NCF is built — minimum capital requirements, supervisory review of capital
adequacy, and market discipline. These three pillars are critically
interdependent and the NCF￿s success hinges on ensuring the proper
functioning of all three of them. Supervisory review is vital to ensure that
capital allocation processes are sound and utilized effectively. Market
discipline, in turn, is necessary to provide incentives for banks to manage
their risks prudently and for supervisors to perform their tasks in a manner
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1 The IMF Staff have submitted comments to the Committee on the proposed revisions to
the capital adequacy framework. This paper, although not formally linked to the comments,
aims to provide background to the comments and to discuss some of the key issues in greater
depth.that instills market confidence. This paper identifies challenges associated
with each of the three pillars and generates recommendations on how they
might be overcome.
On the first pillar, the NCF￿s hallmark proposal to place greater reliance on
internal processes to set capital is well-reasoned, but underestimates the
difficulty of ensuring their accurate and consistent application within and
across national borders. Even among large internationally active banks,
internal rating systems differ widely in terms of purpose, design, and degree
of sophistication, while their accuracy is rarely back-tested or validated.
Without establishing the ultimate benefits and limits of internal systems, it
may be premature to endorse their wholesale adoption for regulatory purposes
until a clear consensus on best practices emerges.
As an alternative to the internal processes approach, the NCF proposes
a refinement to the existing capital framework based on ratings assigned by
external credit rating agencies. Our analysis of the pros and cons of external
ratings and internal rating systems suggest that the use of external credit
ratings, on balance, may involve relatively fewer disadvantages. External
ratings are more stable than market prices and less procyclical than internal
ratings. Moreover, achieving accuracy and consistency in the methodologies
and quality of ratings among a dozen or more recognized rating agencies will
prove easier than doing the same for the internal rating systems of a much
larger number of banks with a wider range of practices.
To the extent that external ratings are adopted, we stress the importance of
having rigorous approval criteria, and draw lessons from the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)￿s experience on designating ￿Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations￿ (NRSROs) in the United States.
In particular, the approval criteria should rely heavily on market feedback and
the track record criterion should be tightened considerably. Given the ￿public
good￿ attributes of ratings, and the need to ensure the consistent application
of approval criteria, there is a strong case for centralizing the recognition of
rating agencies, perhaps in the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
If supervisors rely on banks￿ own internal capital allocation processes to set
capital, the second pillar — supervisory review of capital adequacy and
supervisory judgment — will move to the center stage of capital regulation. In
this context, another pair of fundamental concepts — supervision versus
regulation — is introduced in order to identify why supervision lost out to
regulation in the past, but why conditions might now be ripe for supervision
8 Introductionto reassert itself. In the past, regulation became the preferred approach to
overseeing banks because of the human capital intensity of a judgment-based,
case-by-case approach to supervision, which became difficult to exercise in
large and diversified banking sectors. Supervision, as opposed to regulation,
traditionally has been associated with banking systems in which a few,
relatively large institutions form a ￿club￿ type arrangement. The
consolidation of the banking industry in the leading G-10 countries may be
creating the conditions under which this type of supervision may be a realistic
option for a set of large, internationally active banks. Nonetheless, ensuring
international comparability and consistency of treatment among supervisors
when judgment supersedes rules will require the development and use of
peer-group review mechanisms. Furthermore, it will require years of
technical assistance to bring the supervisory capacity of many emerging
economies up to the standard necessary to make supervisory review an
effective part of bank capital regulation.
With regard to the third, market discipline pillar, we examine the
preconditions for effective market discipline and whether they are satisfied in
developed and developing countries alike. While disclosure is a necessary
condition for market discipline, it is not sufficient. Incentives must exist for
market agents to exercise discipline and governance structures must be
conditioned to generate the desired response. Specific measures that could
enhance the effectiveness of market discipline include disincentives against
the provision of inaccurate information, designing incentive-compatible
safety nets, and opening the financial sector to foreign competition.
Asubsidiary concern of this paper is the applicability of the NCF to emerging
markets. It is evident that the preconditions for implementing important
components of the NCF are absent in most emerging market economies.
Weak legal and regulatory institutions, and the limited human resource
capacities of supervisory agencies, will impair the effectiveness of
supervisory review in evaluating capital adequacy. Similarly, without
efficient markets that send appropriate signals, and corporate governance
structures that respond to them, market discipline cannot play a meaningful
role in promoting financial system soundness. With the preconditions for the
second and third pillars not satisfied, the first pillar will be the only operative
pillar in emerging markets, at least during a transitional period. While the
three-pillar approach to capital adequacy will provide strong incentives for
developing countries to strengthen supervisory capacities and governance
structures, transitional arrangements may be required to ensure that the first
pillar delivers higher levels of capital in emerging market banking systems.
Introduction 9II. The Problem Stated
This section reviews the key features of the Accord and the reasons
motivating the Committee￿s proposal to revise it. While both the Accord and
the NCF share the same objectives of promoting safety and soundness in
financial systems and enhancing competitive equality among them, the NCF
represents a significant departure from the Accord in terms of the principles
it embraces and the methods it employs. This section highlights key trade-
offs among elements of the new framework — for example, between the
accuracy of capital charges and comparability of capital ratios. What
becomes clear is that the NCF￿s objectives are not all achievable at once:
trade-offs exist and choices have to be made, but the NCF￿s sacrifice of the
verifiability and comparability of capital ratios in return for greater accuracy
is well-founded.
The Accord has three main features. In the first place, it is concerned only
with large, internationally active banks. Secondly, it is concerned primarily
with credit risks, although the need for other risks to be incorporated was
recognized at its inception and the Accord has since been amended to reflect
this (most notably in the form of the 1996 Market Risk Amendment).
Thirdly, it provides an avowedly crude and simple methodology for assessing
capital adequacy. Nonetheless, the Accord￿s simplicity helps secure the goals
of comparability and verifiability; by subjecting all banks to a common risk
measurement framework, the Accord produces a single metric, in the form
of the 8 percent capital ratio, against which they can be compared and
judged.
Despite these advantages, almost from the outset the Accord was criticized
for its failure to incorporate key insights of the theory of finance. Most
notably, its risk measurement framework does not generate a capital
advantage for banks that have well-diversified portfolios, even though
finance theory indicates that they should be treated as less risky than banks
with concentrated portfolios. Moreover, its system of four risk ￿buckets￿ (of
0, 20, 50, and 100 percent respectively) has been criticized as being too
crude, and the 8 percent minimum capital ratio has been rejected as arbitrary.
Finally, the different risk weightings the Accord assigned to OECD and non-
OECD members were criticized first on the grounds that they were arbitrary
and politically motivated; and subsequently because, with the expansion of
the OECD￿s membership, they appeared to favor some countries that were
11less creditworthy than other non-OECD members.
2 These and other features
of the Accord, it has been argued, have resulted in distortionary effects in
international banking markets.
The Accord￿s distortionary effects may have become more pronounced in
recent years. During the period when many developed and developing
country banking systems had not yet met minimum capital requirements,
comparability across banks and countries provided strong incentives to
achieve the minimum standard. To its credit, the Accord has successfully met
its primary objective, which was to stop, and then reverse, the secular decline
in banks￿ capital experienced throughout much of the twentieth century (see
Chart 1). But once achieved, the transparency and verifiability of capital
ratios may have had the opposite effect; engendering a degree of complacency
among regulators, market participants, and banks. The achievement of the
minimum requirement may have been overweighted in the evaluation of bank
and systemic soundness, without due regard to asset quality, loan valuation,
and loss recognition, which are essential complements of capital adequacy.
Source: Saunders and Wilson, 1999
The simplicity, comparability, and verifiability of capital ratios, in fact, may
have given markets a false sense of certainty and security, especially as the
capitalization of most banking systems worldwide surpassed the 8 percent
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2 The Mexican peso crisis in 1995 occurred shortly after Mexico had been admitted to
OECD membership. The Republic of Korea is another example of a country suffering a severe
financial crisis subsequent to being admitted to the OECD.
Chart 1. Capital Ratios for Canada, U.K., and U.S. (1893-1993)minimum. For example, a bank with a nominally high capital ratio of 12
percent normally would be characterized as ￿well-capitalized,￿ given the
Basel minimum CAR of 8 percent. Yet, a 12 percent ratio may be inadequate
for the bank￿s operating environment and risk profile, which may warrant
a capital ratio of 15 or 20 percent in the economic sense
3 (Greenspan, 1998).
Indeed, prior to the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, many of the
region￿s banking systems were considered adequately or well-capitalized on
the basis of Basel capital adequacy ratios, which clearly misrepresented the
solvency of banks and their ability to cope with economic stress. The
existence of an officially sanctioned quantitative benchmark lends itself to
misuse as quantitative indicators are perceived as more tangible, sometimes
without due regard to their analytical value. This risk is compounded by the
difficulty of analyzing and pricing uncertainty, which predisposes market
participants to seek certainty, however misleading it may be.
The  Accord has also come under pressure as a result of several other
important developments. First of all, a decade of innovation by financial
markets, in some cases with the intention of circumventing the Accord, has
eroded its effectiveness. For example, neither securitization nor credit
derivatives are adequately captured within the existing framework of the
Accord, which is cast largely in terms of banks￿ conventional on-balance
sheet risks. Moreover, in parallel to this development, risk management
systems employed by the most sophisticated, internationally active banks
have undergone what can only be described as a ￿step change￿ during the
1990s. As a result of rapid innovation in risk measurement technologies
employed by banks, the Accord has come to appear increasingly dated.
At the same time, the Accord has been presented with the challenge of
becoming accepted as the de facto standard that is applied by most
supervisors around the world. Its status as the international standard for bank
capital adequacy has been cemented by reference to it in the Basel Core
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. This development has placed
a burden on the Accord that it was never intended to bear. In particular, it has
led to its application in the emerging market and developing economies,
where many of its necessary preconditions are absent. Without proper rules
on asset valuation, loan loss recognition and provisioning, and an effective
legal infrastructure that permit banks to enforce the terms of debt contracts,
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3 In fact, supervisory authorities in many countries, including Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil,
Estonia, India, Hong Kong SAR, Kuwait, Latvia, Singapore, Thailand, and Uganda have
implemented higher CARs ranging from 8.5 percent to 12 percent.any capital adequacy assessment based on the Accord￿s methodology is
bound to be misleading. Yet this is precisely the context in which the Accord
is being used by many supervisory authorities today. This has also been at the
root of the problems in transposing the Accord into non-G-10 countries and
will remain a challenge in implementing the NCF in parts of the world.
The main innovations of the NCF compared with the Accord are, first, that it
aims to bring the methodology of calculating capital requirements more
closely into line with the advances in risk management technology that have
occurred since 1988 and, second, that it aims to move capital regulation in
a more process-oriented direction. Hence, the NCF aims to go further than
simply bringing a number of innovative financial instruments within the
scope of the Accord. It does not merely aim at an ex post adjustment of the
Accord to accommodate market developments. It also aims to be forward-
looking by making capital standards less distortionary ex ante. The overall
objective is to limit the incentives that capital standards create for banks to
arbitrage its requirements by more closely aligning capital charges with loss
risks. Ultimately, the NCF￿s emphasis is on the need to deal with market
innovations rather than the problems of the standard￿s application to emerging
markets, and a major objective of the consultation document is to
accommodate the market developments that have transformed the nature of
credit risk in banking.
Whereas the original Accord laid down a series of simple rules in order to
develop a common metric for setting bank capital requirements, the NCF
envisages an approach in which supervisors will become less involved in
determining the precise rules of calculating capital adequacy. Instead,
supervisors will concentrate on ensuring that a bank￿s internal risk
management procedures (and, hence, its internal systems for allocating
capital) are adequate. In this paper we refer to this as a shift from rules-based
to process-oriented regulation.
The approach outlined in the NCF is, in fact, an extension of the approach
already adopted in the 1996 Market Risk Amendment. This Amendment to
the Accord permitted banks to use their own internal Value at Risk (VaR)
models to calculate capital needed for market risk, provided that the model
and the risk management procedures in which they were embedded could
meet certain conditions. While statistically based credit risk models represent
a counterpart to the VaR models permitted by the Market Risk Amendment,
they are too underdeveloped yet to be accepted for regulatory purposes. The
conceptual and practical problems that remain with these models have been
14 The Problem Statedserious enough for the Committee to reserve its position on their use, although
leaving open the option for their adoption in the future. In the interim, it has
sought to move capital regulation in a process-oriented direction based on the
proposal to use banks￿ own internal credit rating systems as the basis for
capital allocation.
Like the market risk amendment, the NCF also offers a ￿standardized￿
approach as an alternative to the process-oriented one. This is a refined
version of the original Accord framework, although with the variation that the
risk ￿buckets￿ will become more differentiated, and ratings generated by the
rating agencies will become the basis for allocating capital. However,
although the emphasis given to the rating agencies is an important innovation,
the fundamental reorientation in regulatory approach to setting bank capital
occurs with the Committee￿s process-oriented approach to setting bank
capital.  While setting capital charges according to external credit ratings is
a mere refinement of the current minimum standards, basing capital charges
on internal ratings systems is an entirely different approach to bank capital,
which rests on the regulatory assessment of the process by which capital is
allocated.
We now turn to laying out a conceptual map on which the theoretical and
practical underpinnings of the Accord and the NCF can be grounded.
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This section develops two contrasting pairs of concepts, which provide the
essential underpinning to an evaluation of the NCF￿s aims and objectives.
These are (1) the contrast between economic and regulatory capital; and (2)
the contrast between rules-based and process-oriented capital regulation.
These pairs of concepts are best thought of as ￿ideal types￿ or models to
which the actual capital regulations can conform in varying degrees. They are
nonetheless useful in providing a frame of reference for the analysis of the
innovative features of the NCF.
A. Regulatory versus Economic Capital
The difference between regulatory and economic capital occurs across two
dimensions. The first relates to the actual quantum of capital held; the second
concerns the methodology that is employed to calculate this quantum.
With regard to the first of these dimensions, economic capital can be defined
as the quantum of capital that a firm determines is prudent, desirable and
achievable over the long term in the absence of regulatory requirements
(Berger et al, 1995). The purpose of economic capital is primarily to limit the
probability of bank failure, according to the owners￿subjective assessment of
the probability of failure, and secondarily to finance bank activities. Internal
capital allocation processes, therefore, aim to ensure that sufficient capital is
set aside for the risks undertaken by the bank. Shareholder value is
maximized when long run risk-adjusted return on equity is maximized. One
method of quantifying the risk adjusted return is to measure returns — net of
expected losses — against the capital that should be allocated to a transaction
to reflect that transaction￿s risk. On the margin, the level of capitalization
equates the marginal benefit of gearing with the private costs of failure
(Schaeffer, 1992). The ￿bank-specific￿ equilibrium level of capital is
precisely where a bank aspires to be and which it targets as an optimum from
the standpoint of its shareholders.
The difference between economic and regulatory capital is that the latter takes
into account the public costs of bank failure (Schaeffer, 1992). Given the
systemic costs associated with individual bank failures, regulators want to
ensure that negative externalities are incorporated into banks￿ pricing
decisions. However, the essence of economic capital is that it is only
17concerned with the private costs of bank failure, not with the costs that it
might potentially impose on the rest of the financial sector or on the real
economy. Since regulation exists to ensure that these costs are taken into
account by participants in the financial markets, regulatory capital
requirements should be set at levels that require participants to take account
of these costs. In consequence, regulatory capital is likely to require banks to
maintain more capital than they would hold otherwise according to their
internal capital allocation systems.
Economic and regulatory capital can also differ according to the methodology
that is employed to calculate the required quantum of capital. In principle, the
method for calculating both types of capital can be rules-based or process-
based. In practice, regulators have tended to accept industry-standard
approaches to setting capital, rather than creating their own methodology of
capital calculation, and thus the methods for calculating the two types of
capital have not diverged significantly until recently. In periods of rapid
technological development (as occurred during the 1990s) regulatory
methodologies may lag behind those used by the industry, since regulatory
standards evolve less rapidly than those used in the industry.
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B. Rules versus Process-Oriented Regulation
The second set of contrasting concepts on which this paper relies is the
dichotomy between rules- and process-oriented regulation. Rules-based
regulation sets prescriptive standards that regulated firms are required to
follow. In the context of capital regulation, it relies largely on the application
of simple mechanical formulas for assessing how much capital a bank should
be required to hold. Rules-based regulation thus aims for consistency across
institutions — indeed, it might be criticized on the grounds that it adopts
a ￿one-size-fits-all￿ or ￿cookie cutter￿ approach to assessing risk. The essence
of this approach is that it represents an attempt to monitor the prudential
soundness of banks by using a standardized risk measurement framework,
which is applied to all institutions and which employs data based on a snap-
shot of their balance sheets on certain specified reporting dates. The approach
is standardized since regulators specify the precise form in which the
calculation of the capital adequacy is to be performed — for example, the
specific risk categories to which assets are assigned. It is also a calculation
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4 For example, the regulatory methodology is often written into formal regulations or
legislation, which requires time to change.that is intended to be performed only periodically, reflecting the assumption
that that credit risk (i.e., the risk of borrower default) is the main type of risk
arising from banking activity, and problem loans can be detected sometime in
advance of default. If a loan goes bad, provisions can be made, and possibly
a workout organized. It is not necessary to monitor these risks on a real-time
basis, while the skills called for in monitoring them are those of credit
analysis and audit.
By contrast, a process-oriented approach rejects both the ideas of
standardization and that periodic reports are a sufficient basis on which to
assess a bank￿s financial soundness. Standardization is inappropriate, it is
argued, because capital adequacy must vary according to the quality and
character of a bank￿s assets, the competence of its management, and the
stability of the environment in which it operates; no simple mechanistic
formula can adequately reflect these factors (Estrella, 1998). While this has
always been true, advances in technology and product innovation have made
mechanistic formulas ever more inadequate as a means of assessing capital
adequacy, since it is not possible to predetermine a set of rules that will
capture all aspects of the risks incurred by banks given the dynamic, evolving
character of the industry. This dynamism has also undermined the traditional
approach based on periodic reporting to supervisors. As Greenspan has
remarked:
￿The use of new technology and instruments in rapidly changing
financial markets means that some bank balance sheets are
already obsolescent before the ink dries. They are not even
necessarily indicative of risk exposures that might prevail the
next day. In such a context, the supervisor must rely on his
evaluation of risk management procedures as a supplement to —
and in extreme cases, a substitute for — balance sheet facts. As
the 21st century unfolds, the supervisors￿ evaluation of safety
and soundness, of necessity, increasingly will be focused on
process, and less on historical records (Greenspan, 1996).￿
Thus, an emphasis on the adequacy of processes is to take the place of
standardization and periodic reporting. Instead of prescribing rules for
assessing capital adequacy, the supervisors should aim to assess the adequacy
of the internal processes used by firms to assess their own risks.
There are a number of important differences between process- and rules-
based regulation. First, process-oriented regulation is harder to implement
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reviewing the adequacy of capital allocation mechanisms. Second, it
incorporates measures determined by each individual bank using proprietary
information, which the firm may be reluctant to make public on competitive
grounds.  Third, given that processes rely on institution-specific and
proprietary information, they are difficult to replicate and validate, and
therefore less transparent. Fourth, by design and in practice, process-oriented
regulation does not aim to subject all banks to a common risk assessment
framework and hence is not readily comparable across firms. In all these
respects, process-oriented regulation is the exact opposite of rules-based
regulation.
This pair of contrasts provides a conceptual map for navigating through the
differences between the Accord and the NCF. In essence, the framework
envisaged in the NCF involves a move across two dimensions (1) from
regulatory to economic capital; and (2) from rules to process-oriented
regulation.  The change is a matter of degree, not of kind; it is not all-or-
nothing. Thus, the NCF retains elements of regulatory and rules-based capital
regulation, just as the Accord incorporated elements of economic and process-
oriented approaches. Nonetheless, the change in regulatory approach
represented by the NCF is substantial and important, and occurs across both
of these dimensions at once.
C. Locating the 1988 Accord on the Conceptual Map
The 1988 Accord features both the regulatory and rules-based features
discussed above. The Accord stipulated capital as a minimum, and the
minimum level chosen (i.e., 8 percent of risk-adjusted assets) generally
exceeded the capitalization of the banking sectors of the G-10 economies in
the late 1980s. To this extent, it imposed on banks a higher level of capital
adequacy than they had been prepared to hold in the absence of regulation.
This is consistent with our characterization of regulatory capital as setting
a higher standard than economic capital, given that it also takes into account
the social costs of firm failure.
Regulatory capital in the Accord is derived on the basis of a simple, relatively
crude method, albeit one that in the mid-1980s did not diverge greatly from
industry practice. Although the Accord required banks to raise their capital
ratios, its method of calculating capital adequacy was not that far apart from
the methodology then employed by banks to assess capital for economic
purposes. In other words, it was the Accord￿s 8 percent minimum capital ratio
20 A Conceptual Map for Analyzing Capital Requirementsrequirement that had the clearest impact on banks, rather than the specific
mechanism it required them to adopt to calculate their capital adequacy. The
pressures on the Accord that have developed over the last decade have arisen
in part because advances in risk management technology have outstripped the
simple, mechanistic model on which the Accord relies (Taylor, 1998).
The  Accord also approximates to what we have termed a rules-based
approach. Its aim was not to produce a precise quantification of risk, but
a first-order, comprehensive approximation based on the application of
a number of simple rules. This conferred it with a number of advantages.
First, a rules-based approach is easy to implement. Second, it is an objective
measure that is easily verifiable and reproducible. Third, as a common metric,
it is comparable across institutions worldwide and promotes competitive
equality among banking industries.
Nonetheless, process-oriented regulation also had its place in the Accord,
albeit in a subordinate role. The authors of the Accord recognized the
limitations of their methodology and intended that it be supplemented by
a process of supervisory review, which would involve an assessment of the
risk management capacity and processes of individual banks. For example,
the Accord left out a number of risks to which banks are potentially exposed,
most notably concentration risk and operational risks, especially those
deriving from inadequate systems and controls. The 8 percent capital
requirement was explicitly intended to be a minimum, and a process of
supervisory review was meant to determine the appropriate circumstances for
setting a higher capital requirement based on these additional risk factors. It
was also implicit in the Accord that supervisory review would result in setting
the baseline capital requirement at a higher level for all institutions if factors
in a specific country￿s macroeconomic environment — for example, excessive
reliance of the export of a few commodities — warranted it. In this sense, the
rules-based aspect of the Accord was only to be one element in determining
whether or not a bank could be regarded as well-capitalized, and the actual
capital ratio set for each institution would reflect the process of supervisory
judgment. As the first chairman of the Basel Committee, Sir George Blunden,
once remarked, a capital ratio was valuable as ￿a yardstick, not a categorical
imperative (Blunden, 1975).￿
Thus, the banks which operated at the 8 percent minimum were to have been
the best managed and well-diversified institutions operating from the G-10
industrialized countries; to the extent that most banks were less well-
diversified or were comparatively lacking in risk management capacity, or
A Conceptual Map for Analyzing Capital Requirements 21that they operated in a more volatile macroeconomic environment, they
would be expected to maintain a capital ratio in excess of the 8 percent
minimum. In this respect, therefore, the process of supervisory review was
intended to compensate for those elements of a bank￿s risk profile that were
left out of the Accord￿s framework. Thus, the criticism, for example, that the
risk measurement framework made no allowance for well-diversified
portfolios was answered by the argument that only banks with well-
diversified portfolios should be able to operate at the 8 percent minimum. To
the extent that a bank had a more concentrated portfolio, this would be
identified through the process of supervisory review, and a higher capital
requirement would be set.
In practice, however, this feature of the Accord￿s methodology has not played
the central role that was initially envisaged. Rather than employing the
process of supervisory review as a supplement to the Accord￿s methodology,
most supervisory authorities have regarded the 8 percent minimum as
a ￿categorical imperative￿ rather than as a yardstick. In its application — if not
the original intention — the mechanistic, rules-based features of the Accord
have prevailed over its process-oriented elements. Rather than using the
Accord￿s framework as the starting point for an assessment of capital
adequacy, it has instead become a largely mechanistic process in which the
only supervisory judgment has tended to be whether the Accord￿s rules have
been complied with. This has meant that the 8 percent minimum standard has
been perceived as the only standard that need apply to banks and has become
synonymous with a bank being treated as ￿adequately-capitalized.￿ In
addition, there have been political and presentational difficulties for countries
outside the G-10 to acknowledge that the 8 percent minimum may not be
adequate for their banks. Although some supervisory authorities have adopted
a capital requirement above the 8 percent minimum for all their institutions,
5
they have been the exception rather than the rule. Instead, the 8 percent figure
has been adopted as the de facto international standard.
D. Locating the NCF on the Conceptual Map
When contrasted with the 1988 Accord, the NCF paper involves a significant
shift across both dimensions of our conceptual map. It attempts to narrow the
differences that have arisen between economic and regulatory capital over the
last decade, aligning the methodology for calculating regulatory capital (if not
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5 See footnote 4 for examples of the countries that have adopted a higher standard.the actual quantum of capital required) more closely with advances in risk
management practice during the 1990s. It also involves a relative shift away
from the mechanistic, formulaic approach to setting bank capital that we have
characterized as ￿rules-driven￿ toward a more process-oriented form of
regulation.
The methodology of the 1988 Accord may originally have been aligned with
the industry standard approach to assessing capital adequacy, but the two
methodologies have since drifted apart. The NCF now attempts to narrow, if
not eliminate, the gap between methodologies for assessing economic and
regulatory capital. The use of external ratings would align capital charges
with loss risks more closely than current capital requirements. The potential
use of internal rating systems and credit risk models goes even further. The
endorsement of internal capital allocation mechanisms in setting regulatory
capital, in effect, means the wholesale adoption, for regulatory purposes, of
the methodologies for calculating economic capital currently used by the
firms.
The primary difference between the NCF and the Accord is that the
former￿s attempt to realign the methodologies of economic and regulatory
capital also involves a shift in our second dimension, i.e., from rules- to
process-regulation. This shift in emphasis involves foregoing the verifiability
and comparability of capital ratios across banks and banking systems to the
extent that it involves greater reliance on internal risk measurement and
control systems. This will have important consequences. The lack of
comparability of capital ratios and greater uncertainty over their derivation in
the NCF will force market analysts to cease placing a burden on capital ratios
that in reality they cannot bear. Instead, banks will have to be evaluated more
holistically by analysts and regulators alike and capital ratios will become less
comparable on their own. Capital ratios, high or low, will become more
difficult to interpret and the terms ￿undercapitalized￿ and ￿well-capitalized￿
will be difficult to designate without in-depth analysis. Both analysts and
regulators will need to evaluate the process of capital allocation and whether
or not the level of capital adequately reflects the risks embedded in the asset
portfolio.
Chart 2 traces the evolution of capital regulation since the Accord and its
likely path under the NCF across the two intersecting dimensions of the
conceptual map outlined above. At its inception in 1988, the
Accord￿s methodology and its application were intended to be a mix of rules-
based minimum capital requirements and a process-oriented evaluation. The
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evaluation of each bank that would determine whether a higher-than-
minimum capital requirement would be warranted. Moreover, the minimum
capital requirement was above the actual level of capital held by most banks
(i.e., economic capital) in 1988 and, thus, regulatory capital exceeded
economic capital.
By the early 1990s, the Accord moved across and down both dimensions of
the map. First, the Accord￿s application was skewed heavily toward the rule-
based minimum capital pillar, with few countries applying higher-than-
minimum capital requirements to individual banks based on supervisory
review. Second, as the actual level of capital in G-10 banking systems rose,
economic capital caught up with regulatory capital. By the time the NCF was
released in 1999, economic capital surpassed the minimum capital
requirement, which had become largely nonbinding. 
The NCF represents a movement across and up both dimensions of the chart.
Regulatory capital will be realigned with, if not set higher than, economic
capital, while the methodology of determining the quantum of regulatory
capital will become much more process-oriented. Given the uncertainty over
the extent of realignment, we have shown two possible paths for the NCF.
The shift of the balance from rules to processes also raises a number of
fundamental issues of principle. In the first place, relying more heavily on
internal capital allocation systems for setting regulatory capital will be
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Chart 2. Capital Regulation Through Timeproblematic given that the incentive and cost functions of banks and
regulators are not perfectly aligned. Whereas banks naturally focus on the
private costs of failure and allocate capital accordingly, regulators must
concentrate on the public costs and ensure that regulatory capital is
commensurate with the latter. Economic capital determined by banks, in
principle, may be too low for regulatory purposes. Admittedly, economic
capital could be higher in practice where banks are more risk averse than
regulators or if bank managers decide to maintain more capital to enhance
their bank￿s reputation. Nonetheless, such cases are likely to be exceptions
rather than the rule, and regulators cannot count on bank managements￿
conservatism to ensure that economic capital is equal to or higher than the
desirable level of regulatory capital.
Thus the quantum of capital that banks are required to maintain for regulatory
purposes will generally be higher than will be generated by their internal risk
management systems, given the need to incorporate social costs of bank
failures. In the case of the market risk amendment, regulators responded by
applying a ￿scaling factor￿ of three times the internal capital requirement to
the output of VaR models. An important issue in the application of the
process-oriented approach for credit risk is whether a similar scaling factor
will also be employed and, if so, at what level it will be set and how it will be
justified.
The need for more in-depth analyses of banks under the NCF raises two
additional issues, especially with respect to the third pillar. First, internal
processes of capital allocation are inherently less transparent than current
capital ratios. Unless essential elements of internal risk management and
capital allocation mechanisms are disclosed, market participants may not
have the information required to evaluate capital adequacy (though
supervisors presumably would have greater access). This would undermine
the market￿s ability to exert discipline, and along with it, the effectiveness of
the third pillar. Second, even if sufficient information was available, market
participants would have to devote much more resources to analyzing banks,
which they may not elect to undertake given the ￿free-rider￿ problem in the
market for risk analysis. The use of external credit ratings as a refinement to
the current minimum standard approach may be the best compromise for
regulatory capital even in advanced economies, a conclusion which follows
from the discussion of external ratings and internal rating systems presented
below.
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The NCF￿s principal proposal is to replace the present system of capital
charges based on four standardized risk ￿buckets￿ with one based on external
credit ratings or internal risk ratings and credit risk models. The introduction
of finer gradations of risk and a more analytical basis for risk buckets, in
principle, represent major improvements over the existing system. However,
the potential use of credit ratings raises several questions, among them the
selection of rating agencies, changes in the incentives affecting the credit
rating industry and borrowers, and the accuracy of ratings. Similarly, internal
rating systems raise issues over their accuracy, consistency, and the incentive
structures that underpin them.
A. Credit Ratings
The accuracy of ratings
The debate on rating agencies to date has been largely defined by the issue of
the accuracy of ratings and whether or not they are ￿fit￿ to serve as a basis for
capital charges. It is not our intention to discuss this issue in depth and it is
beyond the scope of this paper to review in detail the evidence on the
performance of international rating agencies. But, as detailed in the next
section, analysis of internal rating systems suggests that external credit ratings
may generally be more accurate and less cyclical than internal ratings. As the
IMF￿s most recent International Capital Markets Report (1999) (the
￿Report￿) acknowledges, the agencies failed to give advance warning of the
Asian crisis and steep downgrades had a procyclical effect on capital flows.
It also notes, however, that the reasons were ￿not altogether different from
why the IMF and many others were caught out.￿
6
Importantly, the Report acknowledges the agencies￿proven track record in the
U.S. market — where actual default rates are strongly correlated with ratings
— and that ratings may have been stabilizing rather than destabilizing during
the Asian crisis.
7 It cautions, however, that the agencies may not be devoting
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6 See IMF 1999, p. 121.
7 A comparison of rating trends and spread trends (where spreads serve as a proxy for the
market￿s view of sovereign creditworthiness) for a set of ￿crisis￿ and ￿noncrisis￿ countries
revealed that rating downgrades were much less severe than the surge in loss probabilities
implied by the risk premia demanded by the market. (IMF, 1999, p. 221)enough resources to conduct high quality risk analysis, and to ensure accurate
and timely ratings. For example, in the area of sovereign ratings, on average
one analyst is assigned by the major ratings agencies to cover seven countries.
Others have also argued that country risk services underinvest in the human,
information, and technological resources needed to properly analyze political,
economic, and financial risks (Karacadag and Samuels, 1999). But
underinvestment in analysis is not unique to rating agencies, it applies to all
market participants and arguably to a greater degree.
Risk analysis and ratings as public goods
The problem of resources and underinvestment in risk analysis is deep-rooted
and symptomatic of the externalities in financial markets. Providers of
information and analysis have difficulty capturing the value-added created by
investing in high quality analysis, which must compete with free research
generated by sell-side analysts. Yet, high and low quality analyses are not
always easily distinguishable. High quality analysis pays off only over the
long term, but market participants, including rating agencies, are expected to
deliver positive returns continuously as profit-making businesses. As a result,
market participants tend to ￿free-ride￿ on readily accessible market opinion,
including ratings and free research. Existing rating agencies have partially
overcome this externality owing to their reputation and credibility developed
over decades and the regulatory use of ratings, which enables them to charge
fees from issuers. However, the free-rider problem limits the agencies￿ability
to maintain or augment their reputation by meeting the analytical challenges
of an increasingly complex and interdependent global economy. It also
underscores the challenge for new entrants, which will be even more
resource-constrained.
Rating agencies provide services that, in essence, are public goods. Their
increasing regulatory use both in the United States and in other developed and
emerging economies reinforces the public good characteristics of the
independent and objective risk analysis they provide. The agencies play
a vital role in financial markets not only because ratings are used in
regulation, but also because they contribute to market efficiency in two
respects. First, assuming the agencies￿ objective and independent credit risk
analysis enhance financial institutions￿ own risk analysis and portfolio
decisions, resources are allocated more efficiently. The widespread use of
rating transition matrices and default studies in credit risk models and internal
rating systems, for instance, attests to the contribution of ratings to the
market￿s risk analysis. Second, rating agencies, as market institutions,
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risk analysis, whereby private resources are ￿pooled￿ in rating agencies to
produce independent credit risk ratings for the benefit of all. Nevertheless,
rating agencies are private companies in fierce competition with one another
and accountable to shareholders with an eye to the bottom line.
The NCF￿s proposed use of ratings in setting capital charges subtantially
increases the public good value of ratings. Yet, the additional demand for
ratings induced by the NCF could cause new agencies to proliferate and
competion to intensify. Pressures on the bottom line, in turn, could diminish
the resources devoted to the analysis, rating, and monitoring of issuers. This
underscores the importance of robust selection standards for agencies whose
ratings may be used for capital charges and their consistent application. This,
in turn, raises the issue of the adequacy of the criteria that the Committee
proposes for the regulatory recognition of rating agencies.
Criteria for the regulatory recognition of rating agencies
The proper selection of rating agencies is a key prerequisite to the successful
use of external credit ratings. The NCF proposes that national supervisory
authorities approve agencies according to a predetermined set of criteria. The
eligibility criteria include objectivity, track record, independence,
transparency, credibility, and sufficient resources. As it stands, the proposed
criteria lack the level of detail required for operational use. For example, how
are objectivity and independence to be judged? What level of financial and
staffing resources will be considered adequate, and on what basis?
More importantly, the application of these criteria would require discretion
and subjective judgment to a degree that would make it difficult to ensure
uniformity across countries. Even if the criteria included objective and well-
founded benchmarks in some areas, judgments on issues of objectivity,
independence, and track record inevitably would be subjective. As a result,
approval processes would be prone to inconsistencies at best and
politicization at worst, especially where market discipline is weak.
The track record criterion is poorly defined in its current form. While the NCF
calls for ￿rigorous back testing￿ of the ratings before approving an agency, it
sets the minimum time for an agency to be in operation at only one year. The
Committee appears reluctant to set a higher threshold from fear of erecting
barriers to entry to the ratings industry, which is already oligopolistic.
However, the attempt to strike a balance between the competing goals of
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minimizing the regulatory barrier to new entrants carries risks.
First, it is unfeasible to evaluate the track record of an agency established for
only one year, or even three years, because robust relationships between
ratings and defaults take years, if not decades, to emerge. The fact that
Moody￿s and Standard & Poor￿s, in operation since the early 1900s, are the
only two agencies that publish corporate default studies among the four
NRSROs in the United States attests to the challenge of establishing and
evaluating track records.
8
Second, the concern over erecting regulatory barriers to entry overlooks the
market-based origins of the current structure of the ratings industry. On the
surface, the barriers to entry in the ratings business seem quite low, and start-
up costs appear minimal, comprising a few analysts, office space, computers,
and data sources. With these inputs, ratings and analyses underlying them can
be produced and distributed. But while ratings are opinions of
creditworthiness that are nominally easy to develop, a long time is required
before their value can be gauged, accuracy tested, and market participants can
recognize and use them.
The present structure of the ratings industry principally stems from the
importance of reputation and credibility (i.e., franchise value) as key
determinants of the business success of any agency. Absent reputation and
credibility, providers of risk analysis could not get paid for their work, given
the vast amounts of free research generated and disseminated by market
participants. As such, the time and investment required to build reputation
among investors and market makers is the chief barrier to entry, and one that
is considerably higher than the track record criterion contemplated by the
NCF. The high fixed costs of building a reputation, coupled with the
considerable economies of scale implied by those costs, underpin the
concentrated structure of the ratings industry. The recent merger of
FitchIBCA, the largest rating agency in Europe, and Duff & Phelps, the third
largest agency in the United States, underscores the intense competition in the
sector, despite its concentrated structure, and the scale economies that need to
be achieved to become competitive.
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8 Until recently the SEC regarded five rating agencies as NRSROs for the purposes of
the net capital rule (described below), including Standard & Poor￿s, Moody￿s, FitchIBCA,
Duff & Phelps, and Thomson BankWatch. As of June 1. 2000, FitchIBCA and Duff & Phelps
have merged to create Fitch.Setting the regulatory barrier below market-based thresholds is thus
redundant where market mechanisms function, and distortionary where
market discipline is inoperative. Where regulations may play a decisive role
in shaping a local rating industry by spurring demand for ratings overnight,
a deliberately low barrier to entry would create incentives for inexperienced
and possibly incompetent agencies to operate. Thus, the thresholds used to
evaluate an agency￿s track record should be tightened considerably, with the
minimum requirement for years in operation raised to three years or more.
Ultimately, the key task for supervisors is to distinguish between new rating
agencies striving to build up a reputation and those intent on conquering
market share and maximizing short-term profits (Benink, 1999).
The prospect of new rating agencies proliferating, particularly in less-developed
emerging markets, underscores the importance of adopting strict selection
criteria that are applied rigorously and consistently. Evidence suggests that new
rating agencies tend to assign higher ratings (Cantor and Packer, 1994),
presumably in the interest of securing the business of fee-paying issuers. This
observation is consistent with the intuitive notion that reputation and the
incentive to assign higher ratings are inversely related. To the extent that an
agency already has amassed areputation in the marketplace, it is unlikely to trade
off its reputation for short-term gains in market share and revenue. Conversely,
an agency with no reputation has less to lose by assigning higher ratings to gain
market share, and therefore faces a stronger incentive to do so. This analysis is
supported by evidence from the banking industry, where franchise value is shown
to play a disciplining role. Studies of bank holding companies and savings and
loan institutions in the United States find that institutions with high franchise
value maintain more capital and assume less risk than those with low franchise
value (Demetz et al, 1996; and Brewer and Saidenberg, 1996).
Even though ratings supplied by (new) third agencies are higher, evidence
from the U.S. market also suggests that the prospect of receiving a higher
rating does not drive requests for third ratings. Instead, U.S. firms￿ decision
to solicit a rating from a third rating agency is a function of firm size and age
(Cantor and Packer, 1995). This could suggest that in developed markets
where reputation and credibility count, borrowers are unlikely to seek a third
rating just because it may be higher.
9 However, in markets where reputation
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9 However, an earlier study by the same authors found that issuers rated near the investment-
grade/speculative-grade border were more likely to request athird rating. Among those firms with
split initial ratings (i.e., one investment-grade and one speculative-grade) that requested athird
rating, 85 percent of them received asecond investment-grade rating (Cantor and Packer, 1994).and credibility count for less, ￿cherry-picking￿ of rating agencies by issuers
in search of the highest rating could shape rating demand patterns.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission￿s NRSRO designation
In the context of the Committee￿s proposal, it is instructive to review the
origins of NRSROs in the United States and the SEC￿s review process for
them. The SEC￿s regulatory use of ratings and the term NRSRO initially was
adopted in 1975 for the narrow purpose of distinguishing different grades of
debt securities under the SEC￿s net capital rule (SEC, 1997).
10, 11 Since then,
the SEC has employed ratings for a wide range of regulatory purposes, which
include distinguishing between securities that may be issued using simplified
registration procedures, and limiting the types of securities in which money
market funds can invest. (SEC, 1994)
The SEC￿s review process in designating NRSROs heavily relies on market
makers and participants. The SEC states that ￿the single most important
criterion is that the rating organization is nationally recognized, which means
that the rating organization is recognized in the United States as an issuer of
credible and reliable ratings by the predominant users of securities ratings
(SEC, 1997, emphasis added).￿ In order to determine whether an agency is
nationally recognized, the SEC contacts a sample of market makers,
ascertaining the degree to which an agency￿s ratings are known and relied
upon. The SEC assesses several other factors, including the organizational
structure of the agency, the agency￿s financial resources (to ensure its
independence from the companies it rates), the size and quality of the
agency￿s staff, and its rating procedures. However, none of the secondary
criteria have specific quantitative benchmarks, because of the difficulty in
￿drawing the line.￿
12 Instead, the Commission makes a qualitative judgment
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10 The net capital rule (Rule 15c3-1) requires a broker dealer to reduce the value of the
securities positions that it owns by specified percentages when calculating its capital. Broker-
dealers that own commercial paper, nonconvertible debt securities, and nonconvertible
preferred stock are allowed to reduce their haircuts for these instruments when computing
capital if the instruments are rated investment grade by at least two NRSROs.
11  It is worth noting that the regulatory use of ratings more generally predates the SEC￿s use
of ratings and NRSROs designation. The first usage goes back to the 1930s, when the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board restricted banks to investing
in investment-grade securities. For a comprehensive list of the regulatory use of ratings in the
United States and selected industrial and emerging economies, see IMF (1999).
12 Based on discussions with representatives of the SEC.on the combination of all factors, with market feedback serving as the
decisive factor. The burden of subjective judgment ultimately rests on the
shoulders of the market.
The SEC￿s overall experience and acceptance of the primacy of market over
￿administrative￿ criteria suggest that the NCF￿srating agency selection criteria
maximize the market￿sinput into the approval process, especially in developed
economies. While the regulatory use of ratings may be grounds for a more
￿bureaucratic￿ approval process, a centralized assessment of an agency￿s
competence is unlikely to be superior to the market￿s collective judgment on
an agency￿s credibility and reputation. Admittedly, reliance on a market-based
approval process in most emerging markets, where market discipline is weak,
is not a realistic policy option. Thus, an official review and approval process
based on a set of eligibility criteria is inevitable for many countries.
Nonetheless, the NCF in its current form underestimates the range of
inconsistencies that could emerge in applying subjective criteria when the
responsibility for approving agencies is delegated to national authorities.
A number of thorny issues arise. First, in countries where the approval
process is more lenient, and quality of ratings on borrowers is lower, the
ability of capital standards to achieve banking system soundness and a level
playing field would be compromised. Second, policies will have to be
developed on how to handle rating differences among approved agencies on
the same borrower. Third, consistency among international and local rating
agencies on rating definitions and scales is a key prerequisite for the
successful use of ratings. In this regard, Standard & Poor￿s has proposed that
some kind of public concordant on domestic rating scales be reached to
assure international comparability (Standard & Poor￿s, 1999). Events of
default and rating definitions differ even for the two largest international
rating agencies, Moody￿s and Standard & Poor￿s. Some preliminary work has
already been undertaken on benchmarking individual agencies￿ ratings into
a common measurement framework, which would achieve comparability by
￿denominating￿ ratings in their implied default rates based on historical track
records (Duchataeu and Mann, 2000).
13 Inconsistent approaches in any one
of these areas would undermine the use of external ratings￿ intended
contribution to increasing the precision and effectiveness of capital
standards.
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13 Ideally, ratings would be ￿denominated￿ in implied loss rates, rather than default rates,
but systematic data on recoveries is not available.The potential problems associated with a decentralized approval system can be
avoided by centralizing the approval of eligible rating agencies, perhaps
involving the participation of multilateral financial institutions or
a representative group of local supervisory authorities meeting under the
auspices of the BIS. Acentral authority would ensure consistent application of
the selection criteria and develop auniform approach to resolving administrative
questions that would be applied universally. Undoubtedly, vesting considerable
power in a central authority, whose decisions affect the business prospects of
new rating agencies, could be a source of political pressure. Such pressures are
more likely to be resisted, however, by asingle authority managed transparently
under the scrutiny of global capital markets than several authorities, some of
which may be operating in environments with limited market discipline.
B. Internal Rating Systems
The NCF￿s proposal to use internal risk ratings in capital charges has gained
momentum in recent months as the role of external ratings has become — in
our view — unduly more controversial (The Economist, 1999). Critics of
external ratings are most concerned about the volatility of ratings and their
procyclical impact on capital flows, but the discussion continues to be
overshadowed by recent events in Asia.
In principle, internal ratings have important advantages over external ratings.
Internal ratings potentially incorporate proprietary information on bank
clients that is unavailable to the public at large and to rating agencies, if the
borrower is not rated. The informational advantage of internal systems could
help generate more accurate credit risk assessments on the borrower. Accurate
assessments, in turn, would minimize the difference between regulatory and
economic capital. In addition, the use of internal ratings places the
responsibility of risk management squarely where it belongs: within each
bank, a trend the NCF intends to accelerate. However, the BIS￿s survey on
internal rating systems (IRSs) and another conducted by the Federal Reserve
reveal several aspects of IRSs that raise serious questions about their use in
capital charges (BIS, 2000; Carey and Treacy, 1998).
14
The specific elements of IRSs and their operation differ substantially across
banks. First, the types of IRSs span a continuum ranging from statistical-
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14 The Committee surveyed around 30 large, diversified, international banks, while the
Federal Reserve study is based on the 50 largest banks in the United States. This section is
largely based on the findings of these two surveys.based systems to solely judgment-based systems.
15 Second, banks have
divergent views on what constitutes potential weaknesses with respect to their
exposures. Third, banks differ on the mix of qualitative and quantitative risk
factors they use and the weights they assign to each factor. Fourth, while some
banks have one-dimensional rating systems, in which ratings are assigned to
the borrower, others maintain two-dimensional systems, with the
borrower￿s rating juxtaposed with a rating on the specific facility.
16 Fifth, the
number of grades covering nonimpaired assets ranges widely from 2 to 20.
17
The differences in IRSs go beyond pure mechanics and extend to their
purpose and function. For example, the main function of a system in some
banks is to identify deteriorating loans, whereas in others it is used to compute
internal profitability measures. These, in turn, affect the compensation of
relationship managers. In about 40 percent of U.S. banks surveyed,
relationship managers, as opposed to credit staff, have primary responsibility
for assigning internal ratings, creating potential conflicts of interest.
18 The use
of IRSs for compensation purposes places a burden on bank management to
ensure that adequate controls are in place to offset the incentive to assign high
ratings by relationship managers.
Regardless of the statistical orientation of their system, banks rely heavily on
judgment. Even banks with statistical-based systems are cognizant of the
limitations of models and believe that well-managed judgment-based systems
deliver more accurate risk assessments. A key reason is that statistical models
analyze fixed sets of ratios and apply fixed weights to each indicator, whereas the
appropriate approach to financial analysis depends on the borrower￿sparticulars.
Moreover, banks appear to have limited data and techniques available to estimate
loss characteristics (i.e., the probability that aborrower in agiven risk bucket will
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15 The specific issues raised by credit risk models are discussed in the next sub-section.
16 Specific factors reviewed in rating a facility include collateral taken, seniority, and other
structural features.
17 Internal rating systems with a larger numbers of grades are more costly to operate, given
the extra work required to distinguish finer degrees of risk. The majority of U.S. banks
surveyed expressed an interest in increasing the number of grades, but among those that
expressed such intentions, most of them had no active effort in progress (Carey and Treacy,
1998).
18 Relationship managers￿ primary goal is to generate loan business at the highest possible
risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC). Therefore, they have an incentive to provide overly
favorable credit assessments of their potential clients. By contrast, credit staff￿s main
responsibilities are to undertake risk analysis in the interest of managing the bank￿s overall
exposure and credit risk. As such, they are more independent.default, and the loss likely to be incurred in the event of a default.), given their
short data histories. Available data sources that are incorporated into the models
have large inconsistencies, including different definitions of loss and default.
19
Even though banks have started to collect data, they remain years away from
deriving meaningful default probabilities and loss estimates from their figures.
Finally, only a minority of banks claim to back-test their models, and little
information exists on the validation processes and results.
Thus, models are regarded as providing only indicative ratings, which are
modified by loan officers and management. The importance accorded to
evaluating the management of a potential borrower, in particular, necessarily
requires subjective judgment by the bank. However, the principles and
guidelines regarding which factors to evaluate and how to assess them are
usually worded in broad terms with scarce details on weights to assign to each
factor. Rating criteria are often anchored in institutional culture rather than
written policy, and nurtured and developed through training, mentoring, and
experience.
Another key feature of internal rating systems is that they are point-in-time
assessments of borrower creditworthiness. Almost all banks surveyed indicate
that they base internal ratings on a borrower￿s current condition, usually with
a time horizon of one year. Rarely do they attempt to see through the cycle by
taking a long-term view and incorporating downside scenarios into the
ratings. This renders internal ratings more procyclical than the ratings of
agencies, which at least attempt to see through the cycle.
A survey of 100 small, medium, and large U.S. banks indicates that the
systems of small- and medium-sized banks mirror the characteristics of large
banks, but are much less sophisticated (English and Nelson, 1998). First of
all, not all of the smaller banks (15 percent) have rating systems for business
loans. Moreover, those with rating systems have fewer risk categories. While
one-half of the smaller banks assigned 75 percent or more of their new
business loans to a single rating, less than one-eighth of the large lenders did
the same. Not unlike their large counterparts, the internal ratings of small- and
medium-sized banks are primarily based on the judgment of loan officers. 
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19 In contrast to banks, external rating agencies have long time series on historical ratings
and default rates, which banks frequently use in their models. However, the mapping of rating
agency data to internal rating or credit model grades can lead to materially inaccurate estimates
of default probabilities for internal grades.Perhaps most telling is English and Nelson￿s empirical assessment of the
relationship between internal risk ratings and loan delinquency, which yields
counter-intuitive results. For instance, according to their internal ratings,
smaller banks appear to be making safer loans than large banks, but their
delinquency and charge-off rates are higher than those of large banks.
Moreover, banks￿ (small, medium, and large) charge-offs on business loans
bear no statistical relation to the share of high-risk loans. Instead, charge-offs
are positively correlated with the share of low risk loans, the exact opposite of
what one would expect. Even when regressions were run separately for small,
medium, and large banks, only large banks exhibited a marginally significant
link between the proportion of high-risk loans and delinquency rates.
Credit risk models
Credit risk models serve somewhat different purposes than IRSs, and
therefore warrant a brief discussion of their own. Unlike IRSs, which assign
ratings to individual loans, credit risk models usually model the risk of
a portfolio of loans with similar characteristics, such as residential mortgages
and consumer loans. In terms of design, whereas IRSs vary widely ranging
from statistically oriented systems to judgmental systems, credit risk models
are invariably statistically oriented.
Nonetheless, credit risk models possess much of the same features and
drawbacks of internal rating systems. Data limitations, stemming from the
scarcity of default events and the long-time horizons used to measure credit
risk, remain key impediments to the design and implementation of credit risk
models (BIS, 1999b). These limitations, in turn, lead banks to invoke
a number of simplifying assumptions, including the independence of credit
loss events, and the treatment of the level of loss given default as nonrandom.
Moreover, a consensus on the shape of the probability density function of
losses has not emerged, although most are assumed to have thicker tails than
the normal distribution. Most importantly, analyses of the models￿sensitivity
to the assumptions generally are not performed, nor are periodic back-testing
and validation of their predictive powers.
In another study of credit risk modeling practices concentrating exclusively
on U.S. banks, the authors concluded that,
￿...rapid movement to an internal models approach for setting
RBC (risk-based capital) requirements against the banking book
— as a replacement of the Basle Accord — would be premature
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subjectivity inherent in current credit risk modeling practices
which, in conjunction with limitations of current back-testing
and other validation techniques, should raise important concerns
regarding the ability of banks (or supervisors) to assess model
reliability in an objective manner (Jones and Mingo, 1999).￿
The current state of internal rating systems and credit risk models illustrate
the challenge of using them as a basis for capital charges. First, the wide range
of practices and absence of agreement on any particular system, even within
the most advanced banks in the world, suggest that internal systems and
models will continue to yield inconsistent, if not inaccurate, results. Second,
the multitude of different practices, coupled with the high degree of judgment
and cultural factors involved, makes internal systems difficult to evaluate,
especially given the lack of consensus within banks and among supervisors
on best practices.
C. Preliminary Conclusions on the First Pillar
The overall analysis of the pros and cons of external credit ratings, IRSs, and
credit risk models suggests that the use of external credit ratings in capital
charges may involve comparatively fewer disadvantages for the time being.
Achieving accuracy and consistency in the methodologies and quality of
ratings within and across countries, though challenging, is likely to prove
easier than doing the same for a far greater number of banks with a wider
range of practices. In addition, ratings are likely to be less procyclical than
internal systems and models, whose short time horizon inherently makes
them more procyclical.
Looking ahead, the reliability of external ratings and internal systems and
prospects for their use in capital requirements will be shaped by the
economics of the financial services industry. As the earlier discussion
highlighted, country risk services tend to underinvest in the resources
required to produce high quality analysis owing to profitability concerns.
Banks are also resource-constrained and the increasing reliance on models for
credit risk analysis may reflect competitive pressures that force banks to cut
costs and seek more efficient ways of conducting business and risk analysis.
Further evolution of internal ratings and models through a process of trial and
error therefore will be necessary before they can replace existing capital
assessment methods. While the regulatory endorsement of internal capital
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and perfect these techniques, the ultimate benefits and limitations of internal
mechanisms need to be better understood before using them as a substitute for
regulatory capital requirements. Internal capital allocation processes may
provide supervisors with valuable sources of additional information to factor
into their assessment of capital adequacy, but it is far from clear that they are
yet a potential replacement for a more standardized risk measurement
framework.  As the new capital standards are defined and finalized in the
coming years, regulators will become more informed on the suitability of
IRSs, and banks may be better poised to redress their drawbacks.
Even over the medium term, questions remain about the extent to which
internal capital allocation processes can be adapted to serve regulatory capital
purposes.  While the Committee already has endorsed the use of internal
models for determining capital charges for market risk, the proposed
extension of their use to the banking book is more than just a mere expansion
of their current application. Unlike the trading and derivatives book, which
generally comprises less than a fifth of bank balance sheets, the banking
book￿s share approaches two-thirds of banks￿ total assets. Evidence also
suggests that, historically, losses from traditional banking businesses such as
loans have been far greater than trading losses (Mellyn and Saal, 1998).
A process-oriented approach to bank capital, and the review process
accompanying it, requires supervisors to specify regulatory standards on
those processes. Yet, neither banks nor supervisors possess sufficient
knowledge of, or have agreed on, the best practices for these methods, which
will have to be developed over time.
In the event that a consensus emerges over best practice, further questions
arise concerning the extent to which they should be codified in regulation and
risk-management methods should become ￿standardized.￿ On the one hand,
codifying best practices in regulation or the regulatory endorsement of
specific risk management techniques runs the risk of reducing the diversity of
techniques to the detriment of innovation and the discovery of superior
techiniques. More importantly, the ￿standardization￿ of risk management
practices would involve regulators in the business of banks to a degree that
would imply some responsibility for regulators over the solvency and success
of regulated banks (Koehler, 1999). As Koehler pointedly observes, ￿To the
extent that bankers act in accordance with an increasing volume and detail of
regulation, they have, in effect, succeeded in outsourcing an important part of
their responsibilities.￿ An endorsement by regulators of banks￿ risk
management practices, thus, could create moral hazard problems of its own.
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discretion accorded to banks and supervisors may result in a wide range of
risk management and supervisory review practices in terms of quality and
rigor, undermining the effectiveness of capital standards.
40 The First Pillar: Minimum Capital RequirementsV. The Second Pillar: Supervisory Review
Under the NCF, supervisory review will become an integral part of capital
standards and an essential complement to the first pillar. Supervisory review
is assigned the task of ensuring banks operate above minimum regulatory
capital ratios and maintain adequate internal risk control and capital
allocation processes. The critical role of supervisory review in the NCF as
a whole, especially if a process-oriented approach to bank capital is adopted,
means that supervisory capacities will have to be upgraded in both developed
and emerging economies.
As was discussed earlier, the concept of supervisory review was intended to
play a central role in the 1988 Accord, but failed to become established as
integral to its risk assessment methodology. The NCF framework paper
attempts to reintroduce the process of supervisory review in a way that
cements it as part of the process for determining the required capital ratio.
According to the NCF, the review of banks￿capital adequacy will be based on
a variety of factors, including the experience and quality of bank
management, its risk apetite and track record in managing risk, and the
adequacy of risk management systems and controls (BIS, 1999c). But making
supervisory review central to the assessment of capital adequacy presents
several important challenges. The first problem is to ensure that the attempt
to integrate the supervisory pillar into the quantitative assessment of capital
requirements does not suffer the same fate as in the 1988 Accord. This
requires some consideration of the factors that may have contributed to
supervisory review dropping out of the way the Accord was operated in
practice. On the assumption that supervisory review can be more successfully
integrated as part of the NCF, the second problem is to ensure that it can be
operated effectively. The solutions to these two problems are very closely
linked. To understand why, it is necessary to introduce another pair of
concepts — in this case, the contrast of supervision and regulation.
Regulation and supervision may be characterized as two fundamentally
different approaches to the same task (Quinn, 1993). Regulation is related to
our earlier concept of a rules-based approach to setting capital requirements
since it is concerned with the formulation of precise rules and monitoring
compliance with those rules. It employs standardized approaches to risk
measurement and assessment, and demands comparatively little in terms of
judgment from individual bank regulators and examiners. It may, somewhat
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possible to reduce a large part of the regulatory task to a computer-based
algorithm, for example, for calculating a few key ratios.
By contrast, supervision is concerned with formulating general guidelines
rather than prescriptive rules. Within the broad framework of these
guidelines, individual supervisors are encouraged to employ their own
judgment, based on a detailed understanding of the institution and its
business, to determine the most appropriate standards, including the capital
ratio, required of individual institutions. Its leading characteristics are that it
aims to be flexible, individual, and participative. It is flexible in that it does
not aim to try to make individual banks conform to rigid patterns, and its aim
is to examine ￿each bank...as an individual entity￿ using critiera that ￿must be
adaptable to changing circumstances (Blunden, 1975).￿ It is individual in the
sense that it holds that each bank must be judged according to its specific
circumstances, including a judgment of the quality and capacity of its
management. Finally, it is participative in that it aims to encourage a dialogue
between regulators and bank management; rather than adopting an adversarial
stance toward a regulated entity, regulators instead treat management as
partners in determining the extent of the risks to which the institution is
exposed and how these can be contained.
Process-oriented capital regulation and supervision in this specific sense are
closely linked. Nonetheless, it is worth considering that — far from being an
innovation — supervision is an old established practice that seems to have lost
out to regulation over time. The techniques of supervision developed out of
a set of very specific circumstances; they were practised, above all, by the
Bank of England at a time when it was able to rely on its powers of ￿moral
suasion￿ over the banking sector rather than on formal legal powers. This, in
turn, was a product of a highly concentrated banking sector in which a few
large banks shared a sense of belonging to a common ￿club.￿
20 Indeed,
supervision as practised in this form grew out of what were essentially a set
of club rules with the Bank of England as the presiding judge. It relied on
a series of social norms, which have been defined by Young (1993) as
￿a pattern of behavior that is customary, expected and self-enforcing.￿ Where
banking sectors have been larger and more diversified, as in the United
States, regulation rather than supervision has been the norm. Even in Britain
the framework of banking regulation has been pushed by a variety of
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20 The classic works on the theory of clubs are those of Buchanan (1965) and Olson (1965).pressures in a more regulatory and less supervisory direction (Schooner and
Taylor, 1999).
Indeed, as other countries have striven to develop their supervisory capacity
in recent decades, regulation rather than supervision has been the preferred
form, since many of the self-regulating aspects of club rules have been absent
from their banking systems and are difficult to create without an appropriate
cultural and institutional background. These observations suggest one reason
why the supervisory aspects of the Accord did not attract the importance in
practice that was originally intended for them. Put simply, the institutional
infrastructure necessary for the techniques of supervision to be operated
effectively were absent from many of the countries that have adopted the
Accord. In consequence, the emphasis came to be placed predominantly on
its rules-based aspects.
The second reason why supervision may have lost out to regulation is that it
is extremely intensive of human capital. A supervisory approach, with its
heavy reliance on the judgment of individual supervisors, requires
experienced and highly skilled personnel. By contrast, a regulatory approach
can supplement the inexperience or comparatively low skills of staff with
computer algorithms. Whereas the Accord￿s risk assessment framework
represents a relatively objective measure of a bank￿s capital adequacy, the
process of supervisory review calls on bank regulators to make judgments
that are inherently subjective and may be difficult to defend, especially in the
context of the dialogue between management and regulators that the
supervisory approach aims to encourage. At the very least, it requires skilled
and knowledgeable supervisors who will be able to explain and defend their
decisions, especially as the imposition of a higher capital requirement has
a direct impact on the firm￿s costs. In the circumstances, it may not be
surprising if a combination of inexperience and risk aversion among many
bank regulators has resulted in their concluding that capital requirements are
best approached from a standpoint in which they can achieve a degree of
quantification, albeit a crude one, since this provides an objective measure
about which there can be little scope for argument.
The subjective, judgmental element of supervisory review also presents
problems from the point of view of maintaining international equivalence in
the application of capital standards. Evaluating the range of factors
contemplated by the Committee inevitably involves discretion and subjective
judgment, which would make it virtually impossible to secure consistent
application of review standards worldwide. Moreover, supervisors would
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interest of according them with a competitive advantage. Hence, the greater
the role for supervisory review, the less the Basel framework will be able to
act as an internationally accepted common metric for assessing banks￿capital
adequacy. At a minimum, consistent application of review standards within
and across countries will require some degree of coordination. While
outlining a set of basic principles and guidelines would help with the process
of supervisory review, they cannot substitute for the large element of
judgment and differences in application that are bound to arise.
Potentially, therefore, pressure might build for the use of a peer-group review
mechanism so that the processes by which bank supervisors reach their
judgments are subjected to independent outside scrutiny. This may be
necessary if some consistency of supervisory judgment is to be maintained
and if supervisors from different jurisdictions are to have confidence in each
others￿supervisory judgments. However, the concept of peer review has been
mooted in the past with little success. There is a widespread perception that
the process may be too intrusive and may involve supervisors in second-
guessing each others￿ judgments in a way that ultimately may undermine
mutual confidence rather than build it. An important issue for the Committee
as it moves in the direction of process-oriented regulation is the extent to
which it is prepared to endorse some mechanism for ensuring a broad
consistency of supervisory judgment.
Within the membership of the Committee itself, there will be many
difficulties in making supervisory review a major pillar of the assessment of
banks￿ capital adequacy. However, for many other countries it will be even
more difficult to make use of supervisory review without significant
enhancement of their existing supervisory capacity.
21 Operationalizing
a supervisory framework to review capital allocation processes requires
highly trained and skilled supervisors. Supervisory authorities in G-10
countries, but particularly emerging markets, will be hard-pressed to mobilize
the necessary resources to establish and operate effective supervisory review
functions. Most supervisory agencies in emerging economies are already
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21Accordingly, technical assistance programs to build supervisory capacity may have to be
adopted in several countries. Key elements of a capacity building program may include
(a) a diagnostic assessment of the overall approach to supervision; (b) the implementation of
a risk-based approach to onsite examination; (c) the design of early warning systems for
effective offsite supervision; (d) rigorous follow-up on weaknesses identified onsite or offsite;
and (e) the adoption of a comprehensive training program for the supervisory function.understaffed, and supervisors underpaid. Relying on supervisory review to
a greater extent than hitherto may involve these staff in making important
judgments that they may be technically ill-equipped to make, or which they
find hard to maintain in the face of opposition from powerful and well-
connected senior bankers. Supervisors in many of these countries already find
it hard to apply rules consistently, given the constraints of the environment in
which they operate. Their task will be much more difficult if the NCF gives
a greater role to supervisory judgment — and, hence, discretion — which they
may be unable to exercise without strong political support and the requisite
degree of regulatory independence.
These considerations suggest that supervisory review will probably have
a limited role under the NCF. The most likely outcome is that extensive use
of supervisory review will only be found where (a) bank regulators have the
capacity and the expertise to be able to exercise it, and (b) where the
institutions that are subjected to supervisory review have a sense of
themselves as forming a ￿club￿ with quasi-self-regulatory aspects. These
conditions are most likely satisfied in the regulation of the main
internationally active and diversified banking groups. Indeed, banking on
a global scale has become increasingly more concentrated and therefore
￿club-like.￿ Over the decade spanning 1987-1997, the total assets of the
largest 20 banks in the world increased to 36 percent of total banking assets
in G-10 countries from 27 percent (see Table 1), a trend that undoubtedly has
continued in recent years. These are the groups referred to by the Federal
Reserve as ￿large, complex banking organizations (LCBOs),￿ and their
equivalents authorized by other G-7 countries. In other words, supervisory
reviews will probably only play a major role in the supervision of the 30-40
largest banking groups in the world. Indeed, it is one stated purpose of the
NCF to provide the regulators of these institutions with sufficient flexibility
to gain proper oversight of their operations.
Table 1: Top 20 World Banks￿Assets
Assets Top 20/G-10 Banking
(US$, millions) Assets (%)
1987 3 793 454 26,6
1997 8 649 636 35,6
1998 9 708 616 n/a
Sources:  The Banker, various issues, and OECD, Bank Profitability:
Financial Statements of Banks, various issues.
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present. On the one hand, supervisory review will play a central role in the
risk assessment of the LCBOs and their equivalents; on the other hand, the
rest of the global banking system (both in the G-7 and beyond) will be
primarily dependent on pillars one and three for the assessment of its capital
adequacy. However, as we shall now argue, the role of pillar three may be
limited unless the conditions for exercising market discipline are put in place.
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For the first time, market discipline is assigned an explicit and essential role
in capital standards and its importance as a vital complement to the first two
pillars in the NCF cannot be overstated. As capital requirements shift toward
a process-oriented approach, banks￿ capital adequacy will be less clear-cut
and more difficult to evaluate. Involving market participants as ￿third-party￿
reviewers of banks￿ risk management and capital allocation systems thus
becomes a necessary complement to the supervisory review of capital
adequacy.  The ￿third-party￿ review both enhances the overall evaluation of
capital adequacy and provides banks added incentive to maintain capital
commensurate with their risk profiles.
Market discipline could play an equally important role in capital standards by
serving the purpose of reviewing the reviewers. Supervisors not only face
a technically more challenging task, but in the exercise of discretion and
judgment over subjective and qualititative matters, they are likely to come
under political pressure from banks and other interested parties. Market
discipline could act to counter such forces and provide supervisors with
incentives to conduct their responsibilities rigorously and even-handedly.
Bank disclosure is the principal instrument through which market discipline
is envisaged to operate in the NCF. To this end, the Committee has issued
a separate paper, outlining guidelines on the disclosure of banks￿ capital
structures, risk exposures, and the bases of their capital ratios (BIS, 2000b).
Beyond disclosure, however, the NCF offers little guidance on specific
instruments and ways of enhancing market discipline.
A. Conditions for Market Discipline: Are They Satisfied?
Disclosure and transparency are necessary but not sufficient conditions for
market discipline. Incentives must exist for market participants to analyze
available information and exercise discipline by making considered
judgments on risk and return. Ultimately, even if the market sends proper
signals, market discipline works only if the recipients of those signals actually
respond by altering their behavior. Each one of these essential conditions —
disclosure, incentives to exercise discipline, and recipient response, in turn,
hinge on a set of underlying preconditions all related to governance
structures.
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information required to scrutinize firms, including financial intermediaries. In
the absence of standards that ensure the reliability of financial information,
disclosure by banks will be of limited value. Standards alone are clearly not
enough. Putting high standards into effect hinge on an adequate supply of
trained accountants and reputable auditing firms. In particular, supervisors
need to ensure that banks properly value loans and allocate provisions so that
disclosed information reflects the true risk profile of banks and serves as
a reliable basis for market price signals. While most industrialized countries
meet high accounting and audit standards, many emerging economies still
need to make major improvements in this sphere. This suggests the need for
the Committee to outline a complementary and detailed set of guidelines on
loan valuation, loan classification, and provisioning.
Second, incentives must exist for accurate and timely disclosure. For
example, the intensity of supervision of individual banks could be related to
the accuracy and timeliness of their financial disclosure. Similarly, bank
directors and management could be held legally accountable for the accuracy
of the information provided by their bank. This is a vital part of the incentive
structure created in New Zealand to underpin its largely disclosure-based
supervisory regime.
Third, policies — among them government bail-outs — that shape incentives to
exercise discipline should be designed in a manner that maximizes market
discipline. To the extent that depositors and creditors expect the government
to indiscriminately bail out failed banks and to be made whole under all
circumstances, they have less reason to monitor banks, especially given the
costs of gathering and analyzing information. As far as banks and uninsured
creditors and depositors are concerned, a ￿no bail-out￿ policy is thus
necessary to minimize moral hazard problems. This condition, too, is often
violated in developed and developing economies alike, even during normal
times, but especially during systemic crises where the costs of a potential
systemic collapse exceed the additional payout to uninsured creditors. While
the ex post costs and benefits of bail-outs often justify them, the ex ante
promise and expectation of a bail-out undermines incentives for prudent and
vigilant behavior on the part of lenders and depositors (Lane, 1993).
Fourth, the design of financial safety nets also shapes the incentive structure
facing market agents. Information asymmetries and costs, collective action
problems facing depositors, and contagion — and the negetive externalities
associated with them — are well-established features of financial markets that
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related moral hazard problems, however, can be minimized by ￿incentive-
compatible￿ design features, including low coverage, compulsory
membership, risk-adjusted premiums, and independence (Garcia, 1999).
However, Garcia￿s extensive survey of deposit insurance schemes in 68
countries documents numerous departures from best practices worldwide.
Instituting incentive-compatible deposit insurance schemes and other
elements of the bank safety net are essential to underpin effective market
discipline.
Empirical studies on market discipline are relatively scarce but available
evidence suggests that market signals are sent to banks in developed
countries, where depositors and creditors generally demand risk premia
commensurate with bank creditworthiness. Numerous studies of the U.S.
market find that stock prices, subordinated debt rates, and large (insured) CD
rates are responsive to bank creditworthiness (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996;
and Flannery, 1998).
On emerging markets, evidence is limited and somewhat mixed. One study
found funding rates (inferred by interest expenses-to-debt liabilities), but not
volumes, responsive to bank fundamentals in most of the sample countries
(Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998). Interestingly, the sensivitivity of
funding costs to bank creditworthiness declines in systems where deposit
insurance coverage is high and the scheme is publicly administered, lending
support to the argument that financial safety net designs matter for market
discipline. Another analysis on Argentina, Chile, and Mexico found that bank
deposit volumes vary according to bank creditworthiness, and thus depositors
￿punish banks for risky behavior (Peria and Schmukler, 1999).￿ Available
studies on the subject, however, are not sufficiently broad and robust enough
to conclude that market discipline ultimately works, especially in emerging
markets. In fact, the prevalence of banking crises and continued financial
sector fragility in many countries points to the contrary.
The ultimate test of market discipline is the extent to which institutions — bank
and nonbank — respond to market signals by modifying their behavior. This,
in turn, requires effective governance structures and legal frameworks. For
example, shareholders￿ability to influence management hinges on competent
board members in an executive board that plays an active role monitoring
company management. The protection of shareholder and creditor rights, the
rule of law, the efficiency of courts, and corruption, which are key
determinants of market incentive structures, are found to be highly correlated
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numerous developing economies.
The foregoing analysis suggests that market discipline will not be able to
perform the crucial role assigned to it in the NCF unless and until the
necessary conditions are in place. However, market discipline is most likely
to be absent where it is most needed, i.e., in countries with weak supervisory
frameworks.  An important way of fostering the conditions for market
discipline would be to open the domestic banking sector to foreign banks,
which can bring superior risk management practices and information systems
to the local market. Greater competition, in turn, would exert pressure on
domestic banks to improve their banking practices and disclosure in order to
maintain market share and franshise value.
The importance of instilling market discipline quickly in emerging markets
has prompted some to propose the introduction of a subordinated debt
requirement for banks. (Calomiris, 1998) Requiring banks to issue
subordinated debt would place them under the scrutiny of a class of debt
holders that have strong incentives to monitor banks. As uninsured creditors,
subordinated debt holders would have much greater incentive to discipline
banks compared to insured depositors. Moreover, unlike shareholders, who
face both upside and downside potential, subordinated debt holders would
obtain no benefit on the upside, but pay dearly on the downside. Besides
serving a disciplinary role for banks, the prices at which subordinated debt is
issued and traded would convey valuable information to market participants
and regulators.
At face value, the subordinated debt proposal has certain theoretical
advantages that merit strong consideration. Evidence from Argentina suggests
that requiring banks to issue subordinated debt as part of a coherent set of
measures — including a strictly limited safety net, high (12 percent) minimum
risk-based capital requirements, the obligation for banks to obtain ratings, and
a liquidity requirement — can inject credible market discipline over banks
(Calomiris and Powell, 2000).
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to exhaustively review the pros and
cons of this and other proposals, some questions can be posed. Requiring
banks to issue subordinated debt assumes the existence of a class of nonbank
investors — mutual funds, pension funds, and large companies — large enough
to have an incentive to monitor issuing banks. In the absence of potential
nonbank debt holders, other banks would be the only investors in the debt,
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market.
More importantly, subordinated debt holders cannot act as a substitute for
equity holders. If shareholders are not performing their essential governance
functions and governance structures in the economy are not in place more
generally, subordinated debt is unlikely to make more than a marginal
contribution to market discipline.
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The NCF is an attempt to narrow the widening gap between regulatory and
economic capital, driven by the increasing sophistication of risk management
techniques and capital allocation systems in leading international banks. To
this end, the NCF proposes to shift from a rules-driven approach capital to
a process-oriented one through the adoption of internal capital allocation
mechanisms for regulatory purposes. Supervisory review and market
discipline are introduced as essential complements to the capital
requirements, especially where banks￿ internal systems form the basis of
capital allocation.
The foregoing analysis on internal rating systems and credit risk models has
shown that there are some serious obstacles in the way of a more process-
oriented approach to bank capital. Internal systems differ widely across
banks, involve considerable idiosyncratic judgment, and are ￿point-in-time￿
(rather than ￿through-the-cycle￿) assessments. Most importantly, their short
track records preclude backtesting and validation for now; in consequence, an
assessment of both their limits and benefits will not be possible for the
foreseeable future. Without knowledge and consensus on best practices,
proper supervisory review standards cannot be designed, nor can their
consistent application be assured.
It is also vital to understand the forces behind the increasing sophistication
and efficiency of risk management systems, before adopting them more
widely for regulatory purposes. To the extent that they are primarily driven by
cost-cutting concerns in response to growing competitive pressures, these
processes may be symptomatic of the intertemporal asymmetry between the
costs and benefits of analysis. While there may be short-term gains from
underinvesting in risk analysis at the price of long-term profitability, high
quality risk analysis involves short-term costs in the interest of securing
higher long-term profits. This paper has not attempted to assess the degree to
which externalities and asymmetries measurably distort bank behavior
relating to risk management. Nonetheless, such questions underscore the need
for more research on these issues before internal processes are used to set
regulatory capital.
External credit ratings may have comparatively fewer disadvantages than
internal systems. Despite their failure to predict the Asian crisis — in which
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of credit risk analysis. Consequently, markets and regulators in several
countries have already adopted ratings as essential inputs and determinants
into risk and portfolio management in banks and other intermediaries. The
fewer number of rating agencies (and therefore rating methodologies)
compared to banks, moreover, would make a rating-based approach more
transparent, administratively more manageable, and less burdensome on the
process of supervisory review.
However, the successful use of external ratings in capital standards requires
rigorous (and if possible, market-based) approval criteria and a robust
approval process. The proposed delegation of rating agency approval to
national authorities risks creating inconsistencies and weaknesses in the
selection of rating agencies. One solution is to centralize the process within
the BIS or another authority, with the participation of multilateral financial
institutions or a representative group of local regulatory authorities.
The conditions for the use of supervisory review are arguably becoming
reestablished given the consolidation in the banking sector in the G-10
countries, which is resulting in a small group of leading banks with club-like
characteristics. However, this is likely to result in a bank capital adequacy
standard that more obviously differentiates between a small group of leading
institutions and the rest. Moreover, the high degree of discretion and
subjective judgment involved in a supervisory review, especially in
evaluating process-oriented capital allocation systems, creates room for wide
inconsistencies in the application of capital standards. Ensuring that this pillar
functions effectively will also require substantial investment in the human
capital of supervisors in the developed world, and even more obviously in
developing countries.
Market discipline may also perform a limited function under the new
framework. Disclosure alone is not enough to secure market discipline. An
array of governance structures, including proper accounting standards,
incentive-compatible safety nets, ￿no bail-out￿ policies, the rule of law, and
good corporate governance are also equally vital prerequisites. While there
may be a case for the NCF to incorporate specific market-based instruments
— among them, subordinated-debt and rating requirements — specific
instruments and guidelines cannot substitute for basic elements of good
governance and the political will to effect them.
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